The Houthis will likely reduce the frequency of attacks on ships in the Red Sea as long as the ceasefire remains in effect, but the ceasefire will likely fail beyond its initial phase.
Key highlights regarding this prospect include:
· The Houthis claimed in their January 19 statement that attacks on Israeli-owned vessels would also stop if all three stages of the proposed ceasefire were implemented, which currently includes the full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Gaza-Egypt border, a declaration of an end to hostilities, and discussion regarding post-war management of Gaza. However, it is unlikely that the IDF will withdraw completely from Gaza and access will likely remain highly restricted. The Houthis will likely cite this as justification for ongoing missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks against Israel. Israeli air defenses would likely be more successful in intercepting Houthi attacks if the missiles were fired in single or small numbers, but there is a high risk of damage from falling debris or shrapnel from the interceptor missiles if the interception occurred over Israeli territory.
· If Houthi attacks on Israel resume, US-led coalition attacks on the Houthis will likely continue, thereby re-igniting Houthi attacks on US and UK-affiliated ships, posing a major risk to all transiting ships in the 12-month outlook coming. due to uncertainty surrounding targeting selection. The Houthi group has claimed since the US-led offensive against the Houthis began on January 12, 2024, that it targeted ships belonging to or affiliated with Israel and ships belonging to the US and UK. Our data shows that this represents only 37% of incidents targeting commercial shipping, and the remaining 63% have no clear affiliation with these countries.
· An expanded Israeli campaign aimed at eliminating Houthi leadership and reducing their capabilities may require support from regional allies, which would likely trigger Houthi retaliation against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. S&P Global Market Intelligence considers the formation of such a coalition, likely involving the US and Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as with significant ground troop commitments in Yemen, unlikely unless Gulf markets are provided with material and security support. guarantees from Israel and the US for air defense of critical economic infrastructure and development projects.
· Before a ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis was agreed in 2022, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, the Houthis recorded the highest number of attacks on Saudi Arabia since the Yemeni conflict began in 2015. In 2021, there were 188 attacks compared to 35 in 2020, 132 in 2019, and 112 in 2018, and it’s likely the group will continue to expand its reach. missile and UAV arsenal since then.
· The risks to ongoing Saudi infrastructure and development projects from a return to Houthi attacks would be very high and this might preclude wider Saudi intervention against the Houthis. Israel would seek to use regional security infrastructure, particularly UAE-controlled islands in the Gulf of Aden, as a base point for operations against the Houthis, which would also increase the likelihood that attacks against the UAE would continue until the Houthis’ missile and UAV capabilities are completely exhausted. .
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence
